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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
KATHLEEN NYREHN,
Applicant/Petitioner,
vs.
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION, FRED MEYER
STORES and/or LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE, and EMPLOYERS1
REINSURANCE FUND,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Court of Appeals
Case No. 900010CA
Category No. 6

Defendants, Respondents. :
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER KATHLEEN NYREHN

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
review an order of the Utah State Industrial Commission
pursuant to Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a petition for review of an order of the
Industrial Commission of Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue presented for review on appeal is as
follows:
1.

Did Kathleen Nyrehn suffer a compensable industrial

accident while employed by Fred Meyer Stores on January 23,
1985.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-82.53. Review of order of
administrative law judge or commission - Effect of supplemental order of administrative law judge.
(1) Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with the
order entered by an administrative law judge or the commission may file a motion for review of such order. Upon the
filing of such motion to review his order the administrative
law judge may (a) reopen the case and enter a supplemental
order after holding such further hearing and receiving such
further evidence as he may deem necessary; or (b) amend or
modify his prior order by a supplemental order; or (c) refer
the entire case to the commission. If the administrative law
judge makes a supplemental order, as provided above, it shall
be final unless a motion to review the same shall be filed
with the commission.
Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-82.54. Review of cases and
orders by commission - Procedure - Effect of award.
The commission, upon referral of a case to it by an
administrative law judge, or upon a motion being filed with
it to review its own order, or an administrative law judgefs
supplemental order, shall review the entire record made in
said case, and, in its discretion, may hold further hearings
and receive further evidence, and make findings of fact and
enter its award thereon. The award of the commission shall
be final unless set aside by the Supreme Court as hereinafter
provided.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ms. Nyrehn prevailed b€>fore the Administrative Law
Judge in her application for benefits.

She was not required

to file a Motion for Review to preserve her right to appeal.
The Utah State Industrial Commission did not apply
the correct standard of legal causation when reviewing the
employment activities of the applicant.

The Commission ruled

that an employee with a preexisting impairment had the burden
of proving that an injury resulted from an unusual or
2

extraordinary exertion.

Repetitive exertions and strains

will satisfy the legal causation standard for workers with
preexisting conditions as the sedentary, non-employment life
of a worker does not include repetitive exertions and
strains.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MS. NYREHN DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF THE UTAH
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
Ms. Nyrehn prevailed before the Administrative Law
Judge in her application for benefits in which she claimed
that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of
an industrial accident.

The Administrative Law Judge awarded

to her compensation at the rate of $78.00 per week for the
remainder of her life.

He also ordered the respondent to pay

for reasonable medical treatment for petitioner's work
related injuries.

The employer has argued in its brief that

Ms. Nyrehn should have filed a Motion for Review of this
Order to the Utah State Industrial Commission pursuant to
Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Ann.

Section 35-1-82.53, Utah

Code Ann, provides as follows:
(1) Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with
the Order entered by an Administrative Law Judge
may seek review of that Order with the Commission
by complying with the Commission's rules governing
that review.
(2) The Order of the Commission on review is
final, unless set aside by the Court of Appeals.
3

Ms. Nyrehn was not dissatisfied with the Order
entered by the Administrative Law Judge as he awarded to her
precisely the benefits which she was seeking.

The applicant

may not have concurred with the legal foundation for the
ruling of the Administrative Law Judge and she may not have
concurred with the Findings of Fact made by the Administrative Law Judge.
to her.

However, the result obtained was favorable

The Administrative Law Judge commented at the

conclusion of the hearing:
One final note for the record, I recognize that the
issue will be appealed and I want to caution Ms.
Nyrehn to some respect. I don't want you to go out
thinking you won the total war. You have just won
one battle and I would imagine the bigger war will
be waged at the higher courts. (R. 49)
The Workers Compensation Act does not provide that
a party dissatisfied with the Findings of Fact of an Administrative Law Judge must file a Motion for Review.

Such a

provision, if in our statute, would further burden an
already burdened system.

When a Motion for Review is filed

from an Order of an Administrative Law Judge, the Commission
reviews the entire record and it may make its own findings of
fact and enter its award thereon.

U.S. Steel Corp. v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980).
This matter is not controlled by the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act as it was commenced prior to January 1, 1988.
Accordingly, the Utah State Industrial Commission reviews the
4

Order of the Administrative Law Judge pursuant to Section 3 51-82.54, Utah Code Ann. (1975) (Repealed in 1987, repeal
effective January 1, 1988.)

U.S.X. Corp. v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 781 P.2d 883 (Utah App. 1989).
In this case, the Commission reviewed the Order of
the Administrative Law Judge and reversed it and issued the
following Order:
The application for hearing of the applicant,
Kathleen Nyrehn, is hereby dismissed with prejudice, the applicant having failed to show that
he (sic) suffered a compensable industrial accident
in that he (sic) failed to establish that the
injury was the result of unusual extraordinary
(sic) as per Allen v. Industrial Commission where
the applicant suffered from a preexisting condition.
The Industrial Commission did not make new findings of fact
but adopted certain findings of fact of the Administrative
Law Judge.

It is from these findings of fact and the Order

of the Commission that the applicant takes her appeal.
Cases cited by the employer for its position that
the applicant had waived her right to appeal are those in
which the applicant did not prevail before the Administrative
Law Judge and was dissatisfied with the Order of the Administrative Law Judge.

See, Pease v. Industrial Commission of

Utah, 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984), U.S.X. Corp. v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, supra.

5

POINT II
THE APPLICANT DOES NOT HAVE THE BURDEN OF
PROVING THAT HER INJURY RESULTED FROM AN
UNUSUAL, EXTRAORDINARY EXERTION.
The Commission in its Order dismissed the applicant's petition for the reason that the applicant failed to
demonstrate that her injury was the result of "unusual
extraordinary (exertion).11

The employer in its brief cites

language of the Administrative Law Judge who commented at the
hearing as follows:
Lifting tubs weighing 15 to 40 pounds 3 6 times or
72 times, is not the crucial issue. It is whether
something unusual happened, some extraordinary
exertion happened, and in this case, the applicant
has failed to establish that. (R. 458)
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 198 6), the Utah Supreme Court adopted legal and medical
causation tests to be applied in determining whether an
industrial accident is compensable.

Workers with preexisting

conditions must show that their employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk of injury which
such workers already face in everyday life because of their
preexisting condition.

The Utah Supreme Court adopted an

objective standard of comparison.

The exertion of the

injured worker is compared to typical non-employment activities generally expected by people in today's society.
The Supreme Court did not define the typical non-employment
activities, but suggested:
6

The case law will eventually define a standard for
typical non-employment activity in much the way
case law has developed the standard of care for the
reasonable man in tort law.
729 P.2d at 27.
The exertion engaged in by the worker suffering a
preexisting injury need only be sufficient to demonstrate
that the risk of harm faced by the injured worker at his
employment is greater than the risk of harm he already faced
in everyday life because of the preexisting condition.

Allen

v. Industrial Commission.
The Administrative Law Judge and the Utah State
Industrial Commission imposed on the applicant the burden of
demonstrating that she engaged in unusual, extraordinary
exertion.

Although it is true that unusual, extraordinary

exertion satisfies the legal causation test of Allen, it is
not the exclusive test for legal causation for workers with
preexisting injuries.
The applicant asserts that the repetitive bending,
stooping and lifting in the course of one's employment
satisfies the legal causation standard for workers with
preexisting conditions.

Despite the forecast in Allen, the

case law has yet to define a standard for typical "nonemployment activity."

Other jurisdictions which have adopted

the dual causation standard have not required an applicant to
demonstrate that the exertion causing the injury was unusual
or extraordinary.

Guidrv v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc.,
7

418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982), cited by the Utah Supreme Court in
Allen v. Industrial Commission at footnote 7.
Mr. Guidry died from a heart attack while resting
during a break from his employment.
as an industrial painter.
sclerotic heart disease.

Mr. Guidry was employed

He had a history of atheroOn the day of his death, he

reported to work at 7:30 a.m. as usual.

He and a co-worker:

"were assigned the task of painting large rolling
doors on a warehouse. They were using a single
ladder ten to twelve feet tall. The top portions
of the doors which were out of reach to a painter
working on the ground were painted by [Mr. Guidryfs
co-worker], Guidryfs roll being to brace the ladder
to assure [his co-worker's] safety and to move the
ladder as required. The areas of the door accessible from the ground were painted by the two men.
The pair had worked non-stop from 7:30 a.m. until
the noon break, with only a ten minute break during
that time at 10:00 a.m.
The pair again commenced
working after the lunch break and worked until
approximately 2:00 p.m."
Guidry v, Sline Industrial Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d at 634.
During his afternoon break, Mr. Guidry suffered a heart
attack.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that Mr.
Guidry:
"had performed physical and fairly strenuous
exertion for most of the day. He had returned to
his duties right after lunch and continued to work
until minutes before the attack. Our appreciation
of the evidence in this case prompts us to conclude
that Guidryfs activities while working on the
fateful day of his heart attack, were marked by
stress, exertion and strain greater than that
generated in everyday non-employment life, and
greater than that generated in the more or less
sedentary life of the average non-worker."
8

418 So.2d at 634.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in Guidry focused on
the activity of the decedent throughout the day and concluded
that it was marked by repeated exertions and repeated
strains.

No one exertion was unusual or extraordinary but in

combination Mr. Guidry1s activities exceeded those engaged in
by the average non-worker in his or her non-employment life.
In Allen, the Supreme Court noted certain typical
non-employment activities, i.e., taking out the garbage cans,
lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat
tire, lifting a small child to chest height and climbing the
stairs in buildings.

Each of these activities is an isolated

event which alone would not satisfy the legal causation
standard.

However, if one engaged in these activities

regularly and repetitively throughout an eight hour day, this
conduct would satisfy the legal causation standard for
workers with preexisting conditions.

The sedentary, non-

employment life of a worker does not include repetitive
exertions and strains.

It includes occasional exertions and

strains.
Ms. Nyrehn's employer has argued that the Administrative Law Judge considered the applicant's employment
activities when ruling that her employment activities did not
satisfy the legal causation standard of Allen.

The Findings

of Fact issued by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted by
9

the Utah State Industrial Commission demonstrate that the
analysis engaged in by the Judge and the Commission was
limited to comparing the weight of the tubs lifted by Ms.
Nyrehn to the weight of the object lifted by the injured
worker in Smith & Edwards Co. v. Industrial Commission, 77 0
P.2d 1016 (Utah App. 1989).

This limited analysis is flawed.

It fails to consider the repetitive activities engaged in by
the applicant in her employment.

It fails to compare these

activities to everyday non-employment life.

It is this

failure that renders the decision of the Commission
unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Nyrehn submits that the decision of the Utah
State Industrial Commission denying her benefits should be
reversed and the case should be remanded to the Industrial
Commission for further hearing.
DATED this

j(

day of May, 1990.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

William W. Downes, Jr.
Attorneys for Petitioner
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